This document is downloaded from www.SucManhCongDong.info

1	ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR.			
	United States Attorney			
2	ROBERT E. DUGDALE Assistant United States Attorney			
3	Chief, Criminal Division			
	JOSEPH N. AKROTIRIANAKIS (Cal. Bar No. 197971)			
4	Assistant United States Attorney			
5	Public Corruption & Civil Rights Section 1300 United States Courthouse			
	312 North Spring Street			
6	Los Angeles, California 90012			
7	Telephone: (213) 894-2467 Facsimile: (213) 894-6436			
	Email: joseph.akrotirianakis@usdoj.gov			
8				
9	Attorneys for Plaintiff UNITED STATES OF AMERICA			
9	ONITED STATES OF AMERICA			
10				
	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
11	FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA			
L2				
13	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,) No.			
)			
4	Plaintiff,) <u>PLEA AGREEMENT FOR DEFENDANT</u>) JOHN TRAN			
L5	v.)			
)			
L6	JOHN TRAN,			
L7	Defendant.)			
·				
18				
L 9	1. This constitutes the plea agreement between JOHN TRAN			
20	("defendant") and the United States Attorney's Office for the			
21	Central District of California ("the USAO") in the above-			
22	captioned case. This agreement is limited to the USAO and canno			
23	bind any other federal, state, local, or foreign prosecuting,			
24	enforcement, administrative, or regulatory authorities.			

2. Defendant agrees to:

25

26

27

28

a) Give up the right to indictment by a grand jury and, at the earliest opportunity requested by the USAO and provided by

DEFENDANT'S OBLIGATIONS

- b) Not contest facts agreed to in this agreement and the Stipulated Statement of Factual Basis attached to this agreement as Exhibit B.
- c) Abide by all agreements regarding sentencing factors contained in this agreement.
- d) Appear for all court appearances, surrender as ordered for service of sentence, obey all conditions of any bond, and obey any other ongoing court order in this matter.
- e) Not commit any crime; however, offenses that would be excluded for sentencing purposes under United States

 Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Sentencing Guidelines")

 § 4A1.2(c) are not within the scope of this agreement.
- f) Be truthful at all times with Pretrial Services, the United States Probation Office, and the Court.
- g) Pay the applicable special assessment at or before the time of sentencing unless defendant lacks the ability to pay and submits a completed financial statement (form OBD-500) to the USAO prior to sentencing.
- h) Make restitution at or before the time of sentencing, and not seek the discharge of any restitution obligation, in whole or in part, in any present or future bankruptcy proceeding.
- i) Allow funds previously seized in connection with this matter in the amount of \$35,000 to be applied by the Court to pay, in order of application, any restitution, special

assessment, criminal fines, and costs that defendant is required to pay, and execute papers as necessary to accomplish this application.

THE USAO'S OBLIGATIONS

3. The USAO agrees:

2.3

- a) Not to contest facts agreed to in this agreement.
- b) To abide by all agreements regarding sentencing factors contained in this agreement.
- c) At the time of sentencing, provided that defendant demonstrates an acceptance of responsibility for the offense up to and including the time of sentencing, to recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable Sentencing Guidelines offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, and recommend and, if necessary, move for an additional one-level reduction if available under that section.
- d) Except for criminal tax violations (including conspiracy to commit such violations chargeable under 18 U.S.C. § 371), not to prosecute defendant further for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1) (Extortion Under Color of Official Right); 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (1) (Attempted Witness Tampering by Corrupt Persuasion); or 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2) (False Statements to Government Agency) arising out of defendant's conduct described in the Statement of Stipulated Factual Basis attached hereto as Exhibit B. Defendant understands that the USAO is free to prosecute defendant criminally for any other unlawful past conduct or any unlawful conduct that occurs after the date of this agreement. Defendant agrees that at the time of sentencing the Court may consider the uncharged conduct in determining the

applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, the propriety and extent of any departure from that range, and the sentence to be imposed after consideration of the Sentencing Guidelines and all other relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

e) Recommend that defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment no higher than the low end of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, provided that the offense level used by the Court to determine that range is 21 or higher and provided that the Court does not depart downward in offense level or criminal history category. For purposes of this agreement, the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines range is that defined by the Sentencing Table in U.S.S.G. Chapter 5, Part A.

NATURE OF THE OFFENSE

4. In order for defendant to be guilty of count one, which charges a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 666(a)(1)(B), the following must be true: (1) defendant was an agent of a state or local government, or any agency of that government; (2) defendant solicited, demanded, accepted or agreed to accept anything of value from another person; (3) defendant did so corruptly with the intent to be influenced or rewarded in connection with some business, transaction, or series of transactions of the state or local government, or agency of that government; (4) this business, transaction, or series of transactions involved any thing of a value of \$5,000 or more; and (5) the state or local government, or agency of that government, in a one year period, received benefits of more than \$10,000 under any federal program involving a grant or other assistance. Defendant admits that defendant is, in fact, quilty of this

offense as described in count one of the information.

PENALTIES AND RESTITUTION

- 5. The statutory maximum sentence that the Court can impose for a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 666(a)(1)(B), is: 10 years imprisonment; a three-year period of supervised release; a fine of \$250,000 or twice the gross gain or gross loss resulting from the offense, whichever is greatest; and a mandatory special assessment of \$100.
- 6. Defendant understands that supervised release is a period of time following imprisonment during which defendant will be subject to various restrictions and requirements. Defendant understands that if defendant violates one or more of the conditions of any supervised release imposed, defendant may be returned to prison for all or part of the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the term of supervised release, which could result in defendant serving a total term of imprisonment greater than the statutory maximum stated above.
- 7. Defendant understands that, by pleading guilty, defendant may be giving up valuable government benefits and valuable civic rights, such as the right to vote, the right to possess a firearm, the right to hold office, and the right to serve on a jury. Defendant understands that once the court accepts defendant's guilty plea, it will be a federal felony for defendant to possess a firearm or ammunition. Defendant understands that the conviction in this case may also subject defendant to various other collateral consequences, including but not limited to revocation of probation, parole, or supervised

release in another case and suspension or revocation of a professional license. Defendant understands that unanticipated collateral consequences will not serve as grounds to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.

2.3

- 8. Defendant understands that, if defendant is not a United States citizen, the felony conviction in this case may subject defendant to removal, also known as deportation, which may, under some circumstances, be mandatory. The court cannot, and defendant's attorney also may not be able to, advise defendant fully regarding the immigration consequences of the felony conviction in this case. Defendant understands that by entering a guilty plea defendant waives any claim that unexpected immigration consequences may render defendant's guilty plea invalid.
- 9. Defendant understands that defendant will be required to pay full restitution to the victim(s) of the offense. Defendant agrees that, in return for the USAO's compliance with its obligations under this agreement, the amount of restitution is not restricted to the amounts alleged in the count to which defendant is pleading guilty and may include losses arising from counts dismissed and charges not prosecuted pursuant to this agreement as well as all relevant conduct in connection with those counts and charges. The parties currently believe that the applicable amount of restitution is approximately \$38,000.00, but recognize and agree that this amount could change based on facts that come to the attention of the parties prior to sentencing.

FACTUAL BASIS

10. Defendant and the USAO agree to the Statement of

Stipulated Factual Basis attached hereto as Exhibit B. Defendant and the USAO agree that this Statement of Stipulated Factual Basis is sufficient to support a plea of guilty to the charge described in this agreement and to establish any agreed upon Sentencing Guidelines, but is not meant to be a complete recitation of all facts relevant to the underlying criminal conduct or all facts known to either party that relate to that conduct.

2.3

SENTENCING FACTORS

- 11. Defendant understands that in determining defendant's sentence the Court is required to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(7), including the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established under the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant understands that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory only, that defendant cannot have any expectation of receiving a sentence within the Sentencing Guidelines range, and that after considering the Sentencing Guidelines and the other § 3553(a) factors, the Court will be free to exercise its discretion to impose any sentence it finds appropriate up to the maximum set by statute for the crime of conviction.
- 12. Defendant and the USAO agree to the following applicable Sentencing Guidelines factors:

Base Offense Level: 14 [U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(a)(1)]

Defendant and the USAO reserve the right to argue that additional specific offense characteristics, adjustments, and departures under the Sentencing Guidelines are appropriate. The parties agree, however, that the two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(1) does not apply, given the parties' view that the

bribe payments described in the attached Statement of Stipulated Factual Basis "constitute a single incident of bribery" within the meaning of Application Note 2 to U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1. The parties also agree that the number of levels by which defendant's base offense level should be increased under U.S.S.G.

 \S 2C1.1(b)(2) is at least 4, but not more than 6.

- 13. Defendant understands that there is no agreement as to defendant's criminal history or criminal history category.
- 14. Defendant and the USAO each reserve the right to argue for a sentence outside the sentencing range established by the Sentencing Guidelines based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(6), and (a)(7).

WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

- 15. Defendant understands that by pleading guilty, defendant gives up the following rights:
 - a) The right to persist in a plea of not guilty.
 - b) The right to a speedy and public trial by jury.
- c) The right to the assistance of an attorney at trial, including the right to have the Court appoint an attorney to represent defendant at trial. Defendant understands, however, that, despite defendant's guilty plea, defendant retains the right to be represented by an attorney -- and, if necessary, to have the Court appoint an attorney if defendant cannot afford one -- at every other stage of the proceeding.
- d) The right to be presumed innocent and to have the burden of proof placed on the government to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
 - e) The right to confront and cross-examine witnesses

against defendant.

- f) The right to testify on defendant's own behalf and present evidence in opposition to the charges, including calling witnesses and subpoenaing those witnesses to testify.
- g) The right not to be compelled to testify, and, if defendant chose not to testify or present evidence, to have that choice not be used against defendant.
- h) Any and all rights to pursue any affirmative defenses, Fourth Amendment or Fifth Amendment claims, and other pretrial motions that have been filed or could be filed.
- 16. Having been fully advised by defendant's attorney regarding application of the statute of limitations to the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty, defendant hereby knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waives, relinquishes, and gives up: (a) any right that defendant might have not to be prosecuted for the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty because of the expiration of the statute of limitations for those offenses prior to the filing of the information alleging those offenses; and (b) any defense, claim, or argument defendant could raise or assert that prosecution of the offenses to which defendant is pleading guilty is barred by the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial violation.

WAIVER OF DNA TESTING

17. Defendant has been advised that the government has in its possession the following items of physical evidence that could be subjected to DNA testing:

\$35,000 in United States currency

Defendant understands that the government does not intend to conduct DNA testing of these items. Defendant understands: (a) before entering a guilty plea pursuant to this agreement, defendant could request DNA testing of evidence in this case; and (b) with respect to the offense to which defendant is pleading guilty pursuant to this agreement, defendant would have the right to request DNA testing of evidence after conviction under the conditions specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3600. Knowing and understanding defendant's right to request DNA testing, defendant voluntarily gives up that right with respect to both the specific items listed above and any other items of evidence there may be in this case that might be subject to DNA testing. Defendant understands that by giving up this right: (a) defendant is giving up any ability to request DNA testing of evidence in this case in the current proceeding, in any proceeding after conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 3600, and in any other proceeding of any type; and (b) defendant will never have another opportunity to have the evidence in this case, whether or not listed above, submitted for DNA testing, and will never have an opportunity to employ the results of DNA testing to support a claim that defendant is innocent of the offense to which defendant is pleading guilty.

WAIVER OF APPEAL OF CONVICTION

18. Defendant understands that, with the exception of an appeal based on a claim that defendant's guilty plea was involuntary, by pleading guilty defendant is waiving and giving up any right to appeal defendant's conviction on the offense to which defendant is pleading guilty.

28 | //

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

MUTUAL WAIVER OF APPEAL OF SENTENCE

2.3

- 19. Defendant agrees that, provided the Court imposes a sentence within the statutory maximum specified above, defendant waives and gives up the right to appeal all of the following: (a) the procedures and calculations used to determine and impose any portion of the sentence, and the manner in which any portion of the sentence was calculated; (b) the term of imprisonment imposed by the Court; (c) the fine imposed by the Court, and the manner in which the fine was determined, provided the fine is within the statutory maximum; (d) the amount and terms of any restitution order imposed by the Court; (e) the term of any probation or supervised release imposed by the Court; and (f) any condition of probation or supervised release imposed by the Court.
- 20. The USAO agrees that, provided all portions of the sentence are at or below the statutory maximum specified above, the USAO gives up its right to appeal any portion of the sentence.

DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR PLACEMENT FOR ANY PRISON TERM

21. Defendant intends to request a recommendation, by the Court, that defendant be designated to serve any term of imprisonment in a United States Bureau of Prisons camp facility within the Southern California region. The USAO agrees not to object to any such request by defendant.

RESULT OF WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA

22. Defendant agrees that if, after entering a guilty plea pursuant to this agreement, defendant seeks to withdraw and succeeds in withdrawing defendant's guilty plea on any basis other than a claim and finding that entry into this plea

agreement was involuntary, then (a) the USAO will be relieved of all of its obligations under this agreement; and (b) should the USAO choose to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then (i) any applicable statute of limitations will be tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action; and (ii) defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.

2.3

RESULT OF VACATUR, REVERSAL OR SET-ASIDE

23. Defendant agrees that if the count of conviction is vacated, reversed, or set aside, or any enhancement imposed by the Court to which the parties stipulated in this agreement is vacated or set aside, both the USAO and defendant will be released from all their obligations under this agreement.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF AGREEMENT

24. This agreement is effective upon signature and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney.

BREACH OF AGREEMENT

25. Defendant agrees that if defendant, at any time after the signature of this agreement and execution of all required certifications by defendant, defendant's counsel, and an Assistant United States Attorney, knowingly violates or fails to perform any of defendant's obligations under this agreement ("a breach"), the USAO may declare this agreement breached. All of

defendant's obligations are material, a single breach of this agreement is sufficient for the USAO to declare a breach, and defendant shall not be deemed to have cured a breach without the express agreement of the USAO in writing. If the USAO declares this agreement breached, and the Court finds such a breach to have occurred, then: (a) if defendant has previously entered a guilty plea pursuant to this agreement, defendant will not be able to withdraw the guilty plea, and (b) the USAO will be relieved of all its obligations under this agreement.

- 26. Following the Court's finding of a knowing breach of this agreement by defendant, should the USAO choose to pursue any charge that was either dismissed or not filed as a result of this agreement, then:
- a) Defendant agrees that any applicable statute of limitations is tolled between the date of defendant's signing of this agreement and the filing commencing any such action.
- b) Defendant waives and gives up all defenses based on the statute of limitations, any claim of pre-indictment delay, or any speedy trial claim with respect to any such action, except to the extent that such defenses existed as of the date of defendant's signing this agreement.
- c) Defendant agrees that: (i) any statements made by defendant, under oath, at the guilty plea hearing (if such a hearing occurred prior to the breach); (ii) the agreed to factual basis statement in this agreement; and (iii) any evidence derived from such statements, shall be admissible against defendant in any such action against defendant, and defendant waives and gives up any claim under the United States Constitution, any statute,

Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 11(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or any other federal rule, that the statements or any evidence derived from the statements should be suppressed or are inadmissible.

COURT AND PROBATION OFFICE NOT PARTIES

- 27. Defendant understands that the Court and the United States Probation Office are not parties to this agreement and need not accept any of the USAO's sentencing recommendations or the parties' agreements to facts or sentencing factors.
- are free to: (a) supplement the facts by supplying relevant information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, (b) correct any and all factual misstatements relating to the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations, and (c) argue on any appeal and collateral review that the Court's Sentencing Guidelines calculations are not error, although each party agrees to maintain its view that any agreed upon sentencing factors are consistent with the facts of this case. While this paragraph permits both the USAO and defendant to submit full and complete factual information to the United States Probation Office and the Court, even if that factual information may be viewed as inconsistent with the facts agreed to in this agreement, this paragraph does not affect defendant's and the USAO's obligations not to contest the facts agreed to in this agreement.
- 29. Defendant understands that even if the Court ignores any sentencing recommendation, finds facts or reaches conclusions different from those agreed to, and/or imposes any sentence up to the maximum established by statute, defendant cannot, for that

reason, withdraw defendant's guilty plea, and defendant will remain bound to fulfill all defendant's obligations under this agreement. Defendant understands that no one -- not the prosecutor, defendant's attorney, or the Court -- can make a binding prediction or promise regarding the sentence defendant will receive, except that it will be within the statutory maximum.

NO ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS

30. Defendant understands that, except as set forth herein, there are no promises, understandings, or agreements between the USAO and defendant or defendant's attorney, and that no additional promise, understanding, or agreement may be entered into unless in a writing signed by all parties or on the record in court.

PLEA AGREEMENT PART OF THE GUILTY PLEA HEARING

31. The parties agree that this agreement will be

17 | //

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

18 | //

19 //

20 //

| | |

//

21

. . .

22 //

23 | //

24 //

25 //

26 //

27 //

28 //

1	considered part of the record of defendant's guilty plea hearing		
2	as if the entire agreement had been read into the record of the		
3	proceeding.		
4	AGREED AND ACCEPTED		
5	UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney		
6 7			
8			
9			
10	JOSEPH N. AKROTIRIANAKIS Assistant United States Attorney		
11			
12	JOHN TRAN Date		
13	Defendant		
14			
15	MICHAEL ZWEIBACK Date		
16	MICHAEL ZWEIBACK Attorney for Defendant JOHN TRAN		
17	JOHN IRAN		
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			

CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT

I am fluent in the English language. I have read this agreement in its entirety. I have had enough time to review and consider this agreement, and I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of it with my attorney. I understand the terms of this agreement, and I voluntarily agree to those terms. I have discussed the evidence with my attorney, and my attorney has advised me of my rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. No promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to me other than those contained in this agreement. No one has threatened or forced me in any way to enter into this agreement. I am satisfied with the representation of my attorney in this matter, and I am pleading quilty because I am quilty of the charges and wish to take advantage of the promises set forth in this agreement, and not for any other reason.

21

20

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

22

JOHN TRAN

Date

24

25

26

27

CERTIFICATION OF DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

I am John Tran's attorney. I have carefully and thoroughly discussed every part of this agreement with my client. Further, I have fully advised my client of his rights, of possible pretrial motions that might be filed, of possible defenses that might be asserted either prior to or at trial, of the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), of relevant Sentencing Guidelines provisions, and of the consequences of entering into this agreement. To my knowledge: no promises, inducements, or representations of any kind have been made to my client other than those contained in this agreement; no one has threatened or forced my client in any way to enter into this agreement; my client's decision to enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one; and the factual basis set forth in this agreement is sufficient to support my client's entry of a guilty plea pursuant to this agreement.

2.3

MICHAEL ZWEIBACK Attorney for Defendant JOHN TRAN Date

2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 No. 12 Plaintiff, INFORMATION 13 [18 U.S.C. \S 666(a)(1)(B): v. Bribery Concerning Programs JOHN TRAN, Receiving Federal Funds] 14 15 Defendant. 16 17 The United States Attorney charges: [18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B)] 18 19 At all times relevant to this information: 20 The City of Rosemead was located in Los Angeles County, within the Central District of California, and was a 21 22 local government that received federal assistance in excess of \$10,000 during the one-year period beginning August 3, 2006, and 23 24 ending August 3, 2007. 25 The City of Rosemead's policy-making and b. 26 legislative authority was vested in a governing city council 27 consisting of the mayor and four other members, all elected on a 28 non-partisan basis.

- c. Members of the Rosemead City Council served four-year terms, with two members elected every two years and three members elected in the subsequent two-year period. The mayor was elected by the City Council. Defendant JOHN TRAN ("TRAN") was elected to the City Council in 2005 and was Mayor of Rosemead from 2007 to 2009.
- d. The Rosemead City Council appointed the city manager, who in turn appointed the heads of the city's various departments. The City Council also appointed the City Clerk, City Attorney, City Treasurer and commissioners of the Planning and the Traffic Commissions.
- e. The Rosemead City Council also acted as the Rosemead Community Development Commission and the Rosemead Housing Development Commission.
- 2. Beginning on a date unknown and continuing until on or about August 3, 2007, in Los Angeles County, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant TRAN corruptly solicited, demanded, accepted, and agreed to accept from a person things of value, namely, cash payments, intending to be influenced and rewarded in connection with the business, a

21 | //

22 | //

23 | //

24 //

25 | //

26 | //

27 //

28 | //

transaction, and a series of transactions of the City of Rosemead involving a thing of value of \$5,000 or more. ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR. United States Attorney ROBERT E. DUGDALE Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division LAWRENCE S. MIDDLETON Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Public Corruption & Civil Rights Section JOSEPH N. AKROTIRIANAKIS Assistant United States Attorney Public Corruption & Civil Rights Section

STATEMENT OF STIPULATED FACTUAL BASIS

Facts Relevant to Federal Jurisdiction

- 1. The City of Rosemead ("the City") was incorporated on August 4, 1959, and is located in Los Angeles County, approximately nine miles east of the City of Los Angeles. The City's policy-making and legislative authority are vested in a governing council consisting of the mayor and four other members, all elected on a non-partisan basis. The City Council appoints the government's manager, who in turn appoints the heads of various departments. The City Council also appoints the City Clerk, City Attorney, and commissioners to the Planning and the Traffic Commissions. The Council also acts as the Rosemead Community Development Commission and the Rosemead Housing Development Commission.
- 2. Members of the Rosemead City Council serve four-year terms, with two members elected every two years and three members elected in the subsequent two-year period. The mayor is elected by councilmembers for a one-year term. Defendant John Tran ("defendant") was elected to the Rosemead City Council in 2005 and was the mayor from 2007 to 2009.
- 3. The City's fiscal year is from July 1 through June 30. Defendant does not dispute that, at trial, the government would be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
- (a) In every year from 2005 through 2010, inclusive, the City received federal grant funds from the United States

 Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD");
- (b) Throughout each such year, the City would draw HUD funds from an allocation; and

(c) In the following years, the City drew the following amounts from allocated HUD funds:

<u>Plan Year</u>	Funded Amount	<u>Drawn Amount</u>
2005	\$1,224,043.93	\$1,224,043.93
2006	\$1,193,152.46	\$1,193,152.46
2007	\$2,575,506.68	\$2,575,506.68
2008	\$2,418,554.72	\$2,418,554.72
2009	\$2,581,959.93	\$2,243,024.32
2010	\$3,188,715.63	\$1,516,654.89

B. The Bribery Scheme

2.3

- 1. The FBI received information that a confidential informant ("CI") had, at defendant's request, provided monetary payments to defendant when defendant was a member of the Rosemead City Council, in exchange for defendant's promise to help the CI obtain permits for a development project.
- 2. The CI is a construction contractor who builds and remodels houses. The CI purchases land upon which a building is built, and the CI then either sells or rents the building.
- 3. In or about 2005, the CI purchased a vacant lot located in Rosemead for approximately \$1.1 million, and formed a limited liability company for the purpose of developing the property. The CI had placed a 50% down-payment on the purchase and mortgaged the remainder of the purchase price. The previous owner of the lot had a blueprint to build an office building. The CI's plan was to continue with the development of an office building that could either be sold or rented to a tenant. When the CI went to City Hall to obtain permits to build the office building, the CI encountered defendant. Defendant asked about

the purpose of the CI's visit to City Hall, and the CI explained it was to obtain permits. Defendant took the CI into City Hall and introduced himself as a member of the City Council.

- 4. The CI explained to defendant and two other City employees that the CI intended to build an office building on the vacant lot. Defendant and the other two employees suggested that the CI build a mixed-use (i.e., business and residential) building instead. They also recommended that the CI purchase the lot adjacent to the CI's vacant lot if the CI wanted to do a mixed-use project. (The CI purchased the adjacent lot for approximately \$700,000.)
- 5. In or about 2005, defendant began making periodic visits to the CI's office to request money. Defendant initially requested to "borrow" \$3,000, and stated that he had assisted the CI with the project. The CI drove to the Bank of the West, located at the intersection of Valley Boulevard and Rosemead Boulevard, obtained \$3,000 in cash, and gave the cash to defendant.
- 6. Between 2005 and 2007, the CI made a series of payments to defendant. The CI's payments to defendant included a cash payment in the amount of \$2,000, on or about August 22, 2005, a cash payment in the amount of \$2,000, on or about December 27, 2005, and a cash payment in the amount of \$3,000, on or about October 24, 2006.
- 7. On or about August 2, 2007, defendant visited the CI's business. When he arrived, defendant checked the office for recording devices. The CI asked why defendant had not done anything in exchange for the money the CI had given him.

Defendant responded that he done "this" for the CI, and handed the CI two City documents that referenced the CI's mixed-use project. The first document was a Rosemead Community Development Commission Staff Report dated April 10, 2007. The document indicated that there were several mixed-use development projects in the preliminary phases of the City's entitlement process and thereafter listed five major mixed-use projects in the City, including the CI's project. The second document was a letter from the City addressed to the CI. The letter provided that the Rosemead Community Development Commission provided preliminary design approval for the CI's mixed-use project during the Commission's April 10, 2007 meeting. The letter further provided that the City could now proceed to the next step in the entitlement process and listed three additional applications and their respective fees. The letter was signed by the Deputy City Manager, the Planning Services Administrator, and the Redevelopment Administrator. Upon receipt of the documents, the CI believed that the City would approve the mixed-use project.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

- 8. During the same visit, defendant also asked the CI for additional money. The CI directed defendant to the CI's business partner, to pick up \$3,200. On the same day, defendant obtained a check in the amount of \$3,200 from the CI's business partner. The check was made payable to "Cash."
- 9. During the time that the CI made payments to defendant, the CI's planning and building proofs were pending approval before the City. Defendant occasionally informed the CI that the CI's project was "there," and that he was "not going anywhere." Based on the CI's conversations with defendant, the CI believed

that the CI would have to accede to defendant's bribe demands if the CI wanted the project approved, and that the CI's project would not be approved if the CI refused to pay defendant.

- 10. In or about August 2007, the CI told defendant that he/she was unwilling to pay him any additional monies.
- 11. In 2009, after two recounts, defendant lost his City Council re-election bid by a single vote. The City had never approved the CI's mixed-use project.